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Abstract
Globalization is a key context for the study of social determinants of health (SDH): broadly stated,
SDH are the conditions in which people live and work, and that affect their opportunities to lead
healthy lives.
In the first article in this three part series, we described the origins of the series in work conducted
for the Globalization Knowledge Network of the World Health Organization's Commission on
Social Determinants of Health and in the Commission's specific concern with health equity. We
identified and defended a definition of globalization that gives primacy to the drivers and effects of
transnational economic integration, and addressed a number of important conceptual and
methodological issues in studying globalization's effects on SDH and their distribution, emphasizing
the need for transdisciplinary approaches that reflect the complexity of the topic.
In this second article, we identify and describe several, often interacting clusters of pathways leading
from globalization to changes in SDH that are relevant to health equity. These involve: trade
liberalization; the global reorganization of production and labour markets; debt crises and
economic restructuring; financial liberalization; urban settings; influences that operate by way of the
physical environment; and health systems changed by the global marketplace.
Background
Globalization is a key context for the study of social deter-
minants of health (SDH): broadly stated, SDH are the
conditions in which people live and work, and that affect
their opportunities to lead healthy lives. In the first article
in this three part series, we described the origins of the
series in work conducted for the Globalization Knowledge
Network (GKN) of the World Health Organization's
Commission on Social Determinants of Health and in the
Commission's specific concern with health equity. We
identified and defended a definition of globalization that
gives primacy to the drivers and effects of transnational
economic integration, and addressed a number of impor-
tant conceptual and methodological issues in studying
globalization's effects on SDH and their distribution,
emphasizing the need for transdisciplinary approaches
that reflect the complexity of the topic.
In this second article, we identify and describe several,
often interacting clusters of pathways that lead from glo-
balization to changes in SDH that are relevant to health
equity and provide an analytical starting point for more
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context-specific research. These involve: trade liberaliza-
tion; the global reorganization of production and labour
markets; debt crises and economic restructuring; financial
liberalization; urban settings; influences that operate by
way of the physical environment; and health systems
changed by the global marketplace. These clusters were
selected based on the authors' many years of research on
how policies adopted by the Group of 8 (G8) countries
affect population health outside the industrialized world,
and on a review of the relevant literature carried out as
preparation for the activities of the GKN.
A theme that emerges consistently across clusters is the
"asymmetrical" character of contemporary globalization
and its impacts, and the increasingly unequal distribution
within and across national borders of gains, losses, and
ability to influence globalization's outcomes. The vocabu-
lary is borrowed from Nancy Birdsall, Director of the
Center for Global Development, who observed that "glo-
balization, as we know it today, is fundamentally asym-
metric. In its benefits and its risks, it works less well for the
currently poor countries and for poor households within
developing countries" [1]. She was writing mainly about
trade policy, where this observation has special force
because, under conditions of liberalized trade, labour
markets tend to reward those who already possess sub-
stantial 'human capital' or the means to acquire it. How-
ever, the observation applies as well to financial crises,
which tend to exacerbate existing patterns of advantage
and disadvantage; to environmental hazards, to which the
poor and otherwise marginalized are systematically more
vulnerable; and to the more general shift away from polit-
ical accountability, admittedly often imperfect, and
toward economic accountability to the holders of prop-
erty rights that is a central element of contemporary glo-
balization [2](p. 31–58). This underlying logic of
asymmetry links the range of findings reported, in sum-
mary form and with illustrative examples, in the sections
that follow. It also provides the basis for the generic policy
prescriptions that we outline in the third and final article
of the series.
Cluster 1: Trade liberalization, growth and poverty 
reduction
Perhaps the most familiar element of contemporary glo-
balization is trade liberalization: the lowering of tariffs
and other barriers to imports that has been a defining
characteristic of the post-World War II economic order. As
a consequence, the value of world trade doubled from 24
percent of world gross domestic product (GDP) in 1960
to 48 percent in 2003 [3](accessed March 17, 2007). The
argument that globalization is beneficial in terms of pop-
ulation health [4] often starts from an equation of globali-
zation with trade liberalization, and invokes comparative
studies on national economies carried out under the aus-
pices of the World Bank [5-7] which concluded that dur-
ing the 1980s and 1990s, the economies of "globalizers"
grew faster than "non-globalizers," thereby expanding the
resources at their disposal to provide health services and
improve access to other SDH, notably through reduction
of extreme poverty.
This conclusion is fragile on several counts. Countries
held up as model high-performing globalizers (China,
India, Malaysia, Thailand and Viet Nam) actually started
out as more closed economies than those non-globalizers
whose economies stalled or declined, mostly in Africa and
Latin America [7]. The problem is one of definition. Glo-
balizers in these studies are defined as countries that saw
their trade/GDP ratio increase since 1977; non-globalizers
are simply those that saw their ratio drop. Thus India and
China are considered globalizers, even though their trade/
GDP ratios at the end of the study period were lower than
the average of all countries studied. Conversely, the non-
globalizers started out more highly integrated into the
world economy. The positive globalization to growth rela-
tionship becomes a questionable artefact of the studies'
design.
Another critique starts from the premise that economic
problems of the non-globalizers are at least partly attrib-
utable to global factors outside the control of national
economic policy-makers: specifically, a decline in com-
modity prices that damaged both the export performance
and the ability to import of countries that were heavily
reliant on commodity exports, but already highly inte-
grated into the global economy on some measures [8-10].
(The decline in commodity prices was partly an effect of
other policies that drove countries into intensified export
competition with one another in order to pay their debts
to external creditors, although this point cannot be
explored further here.) Further, excluding India and
China from the sample – each of which is arguably a spe-
cial case, albeit for different reasons – actually changes the
conclusion: globalizers grew more slowly than non-glo-
balizers over the period 1980–2000 [10].
We accept as given the proposition that poverty (both
absolute and relative) is inimical to health equity and
undermines access to SDH. This point is important
because, to the extent that globalization is associated with
growth, it would appear to be a good thing for population
health if growth reliably reduces poverty without other
offsetting negative consequences. However, similar meth-
odological limitations have been pointed out with respect
to this claim [11]. Added concerns exist about the reliabil-
ity of data on incomes and household assets and the
appropriateness of the World Bank's definitions of pov-
erty with reference to poverty lines or thresholds of US $1/
day and $2/day [12], especially in large metropolitan
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areas [13]. Van Doorslaer and colleagues have recently
shown, for 11 Asian countries, that surveys on which the
World Bank estimates are based understate the extent of
poverty as measured by the $1/day poverty line because
they are based on surveys of the value of household con-
sumption that include out-of-pocket health care costs.
Ironically, then, large numbers of households appear to
have escaped poverty because of catastrophic medical
expenses [14].
Even if for the sake of argument one takes as given the
World Bank measures of poverty, it is not at all clear that
globalization leads to substantial poverty reduction.
Between 1981 and 2001, the number of people in the
world living on $1/day or less fell by 392 million, but the
number of people living on $2/day or less rose by 285
million, indicating only that the economically desperate
are getting slightly less desperate [11](p. 183). Excluding
China, where the accuracy of poverty data has been ques-
tioned [15], World Bank data show that the number of
global poor actually rose by 30 million at the $1/day level
and 567 million at the $2/day level; in sub-Saharan Africa,
the number of people living on $1/day or less doubled
between 1981 and 2001 (from 164 million to 313 mil-
lion), and the number living on $2/day or less almost
doubled (from 288 million to 516 million). Moreover,
half of China's estimated poverty decline occurred from
1981 – 1984, before that country's domestic social policy
changes and embrace of the global marketplace, and has
been attributed to land reform that "gave farmers consid-
erably greater control over their land and output choices"
[11](p. 184),[16].
More detailed attention is not devoted here to debates
about trade and growth performance for three reasons.
First, a more fundamental critique of growth as a route to
poverty reduction, which stands on its own apart from
issues of trade policy, arises from calculations by the New
Economics Foundation showing that growth is a very inef-
fective way of reducing poverty. "Of every $100 of growth
in income per person in the world as a whole between
1981 and 2001, just $1.30 contributed to reducing pov-
erty as measured by the $1-a-day line, and a further $2.80
to reducing poverty between $1-a-day and $2-a-day
lines"; furthermore, the effectiveness of growth in reduc-
ing poverty declined in the 1990s relative to the 1980s
[17](p. 16). This is not just an academic point: recent
studies of social policy in Latin America [18-20] con-
cluded that even a little redistribution of income through
progressive taxation and targeted social programs would
go farther in terms of poverty reduction than many years
of solid economic growth, because of the extremely une-
qual distribution of income and wealth in most countries
in the region.
Second, trade liberalization is usually just one element of
a package of market-oriented economic policy measures
that together increase the economic vulnerability of large
numbers of people, making its effects difficult to isolate
from those of other globalization processes that are occur-
ring simultaneously. These policy measures have often
been actively promoted by the industrialized countries
and the international institutions they dominate, and the
overall implications are explored in greater detail later in
this article and in the third and final article in the series.
Third, even the most ardent enthusiasts of trade liberaliza-
tion concede that there will be direct economic losers: for
example, households whose livelihoods in Zambian man-
ufacturing, Ghanaian poultry production, or (in some
cases) Mexican corn farming were destroyed by low-cost
imports [21-23]. Even when exports are growing rapidly,
survival of existing industries may depend on such meas-
ures as "downsizing and labour shedding" [24](p. 6). Dis-
missing those who lose their livelihoods as "inefficient
incumbents facing increased foreign competition" [25](p.
96) is an inadequate response to the potential health
equity consequences of such transitions. This suggests the
need for a generic focus on labour markets (on which
trade policy is just one influence among many) and the
global reorganization of production as pathways leading
from globalization to changes in access to SDH and in
health outcomes.
Cluster 2: Labour markets and global reorganization of 
production
Along with trade liberalization, and enabled by it, a key
element of globalization is the reorganization of produc-
tion and service provision across multiple national bor-
ders by transnational corporations (TNCs) [26-28]. Early
research on this topic described a "new international divi-
sion of labour," in which labour-intensive manufacturing
operations were relocated outside the industrialized coun-
tries to low-wage jurisdictions, often to Export Processing
Zones (EPZs) that offered a variety of special incentives
for foreign investors [29]. More recent research on globali-
zation and labour markets emphasizes at least three,
related phenomena.
First, a genuinely global labour market is gradually emerg-
ing, driven in part by the integration of India, China and
the former transition economies into the global market-
place [30-32].
Second, as national jurisdictions compete for foreign
direct investment (FDI) and outsourced production, the
need to appear 'business-friendly' may limit governments'
ability to adopt and implement labour standards, health
and safety regulations, and other redistributive social pol-
icy measures [33]. Documented examples are difficult to
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find, which is not surprising since the policy constraint
can be expected to operate by way of the mechanism of
anticipated reaction. (One exception involves Chinese
government proposals to expand the country's very lim-
ited labour rights which, as of late 2006, were openly
opposed by US manufacturing firms that are major inves-
tors in China [34] even though considerable scepticism
about the effectiveness of such labour reforms would be in
order based on recent Chinese history.) Cerny has cap-
tured the potential effects of this dynamic by claiming that
globalization will drive convergence of national social
and economic policies toward the ideal of what he calls
the competition state, focused on "promotion of eco-
nomic activities, whether at home or abroad, which will
make firms and sectors located within the territory of the
state competitive in international markets" [35](p. 136).
Third, production is being fragmented and reorganized
across multiple national borders in global commodity
chains or value chains [36-41], in which each element of
production is located where it contributes most to overall
returns while reducing financial risks. An important ele-
ment of this process is 'outsourcing,' in which production
is undertaken not by subsidiaries or affiliates of a parent
TNC, but rather by notionally independent contract man-
ufacturers and service providers [42] – what might be
thought of as the Nike model, after the athletic shoe firm
that pioneered it [43,44]. Among the important conse-
quences for research on globalization: even figures such as
the estimate, now several years old, that intra-firm trade
between various subsidiaries of TNCs, and between sub-
sidiaries and the parent firm, accounts for one-third of the
value of global trade [45](p. 153) substantially understate
the extent of cross-border integration of production
because they do not capture the growing volume of out-
sourced (sub-contracted) production [42].
The case of Mexico's maquiladora export-oriented manu-
facturing plants and zones is often cited to illustrate some
consequences of pursuing integration into global value
chains: growing economic and social inequalities among
workers [46]; falling wages and deteriorating working
conditions for many or most workers [47,48]; eventual
loss of some jobs to jurisdictions, notably China, which
can offer even lower labour costs [49]; increased work-
place hazards and industrial pollution exposure to which
is in turn related to labour market position [50-52]. These
are not the only effects of economic integration, and
research in other countries emphasizes that distribution
of gains and loses will depend on the niches that individ-
ual workers, firms and national economic policies are able
to carve out in global value chains [53,54]. Substantial
opportunities for employment and income gains exist,
but: "Global value chain pressures are [also] associated
with increasing casualization of labour and excessive
hours of work" [54](p. 25). Worldwide, the winners will
usually be firms and workers with access to the necessary
financial resources, skills ('human capital'), and technol-
ogy. Meanwhile, formerly valuable skills and equipment
cannot always quickly, frictionlessly or affordably be
replaced by those most relevant to the new global market-
place and some workers, firms, industries and regions will
almost inevitably be left behind [24,55].
In terms of effects on income and economic (in)security,
one of the most widely noted effects of global integration
of production is the sharp decline in the wages of, and
demand for, so-called low-skilled workers that has been
associated with deindustrialization in the rich countries
[56]. International relations scholar Robert Cox has
argued without reference to specific country data that glo-
balization divides labour forces into a hierarchical struc-
ture of "integrated, precarious, and excluded" workers
[57]. This typology is validated by 1997 survey data from
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Mexico,
Panama and Venezuela showing that "the occupational
structure has become the foundation for an unyielding
and stable polarization of income," with lower income
personal service, agricultural, commercial and industrial
workers making up 74 percent of the working population;
an intermediate stratum of technicians and administrative
employees 14 percent, and higher-income professionals,
employers and managers just 9 percent [58](p. 61–91).
Although connecting this outcome with globalization
necessarily involves country-specific investigation, the
analysis of these data by the United Nations Economic
Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean
(ECLAC) links "the need to participate competitively in
the world economy" to labour market deregulation,
increased flexibility, and the growth of economic insecu-
rity [58](p. 93–102).
Labour markets' tendency to magnify inequality in the
context of globalization is not confined to one region.
Recently, the World Bank has conceded that despite its
optimistic predictions for global growth and the expan-
sion of a global middle class, labour market changes will
lead to increased economic inequality in countries
accounting for 86 percent of the developing world's pop-
ulation over the period until 2030, with the "unskilled
poor" being left farther behind [31](p. 67–100), even
before taking into account the shift of income shares from
labour to capital that is evident in many national econo-
mies. This shift can be substantial. In Mexico the propor-
tion of GDP going to wages fell from 40 percent in 1976
to 18.9 percent in 2000, during a period of rapid integra-
tion into the global economy and two major economic
crises [59](p. 15–16). Between 1980 and 2006 wages as a
share of national income in the G10 countries' GDP fell
from almost 63% to just under 59%, while corporate prof-
Globalization and Health 2007, 3:6 http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/3/1/6
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its in the G7 countries roles from 13 percent to roughly
15.5 percent [32](p. 6–7). Although we have been unable
to locate satisfactory data on trends in the distribution of
national product between capital and labour worldwide
or by region, this pattern is what one might expect given
the increasing mobility, and therefore bargaining power,
of capital relative to most forms of labour. Workplace
health is a related issue, and an extensive review of studies
published as of the late 1990s identified a clear prepon-
derance of findings that precarious or contingent work is
associated with deteriorations in health and safety protec-
tions [60,61] – an especially important observation in
view of the worldwide growth in such employment [62].
Like many other aspects of globalization [63-67], its trans-
formation of labour markets affects men and women dif-
ferently [68]. Although poor working conditions for
women are cited as a characteristic of maquiladora employ-
ment [69-71], observers of export-oriented employment
elsewhere in the world argue: "The reality is that, for many
women, working in exports is better than the alternatives
of working (or being unemployed) in the domestic econ-
omy" [67](p. 2); see also [72-74]. A United Nations
Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD)
study of export-oriented employment in South Korea,
China, Mexico, Mauritius, South Africa, and India found
it to be associated with some economic gains for women,
in terms both of labour incomes and of work-related enti-
tlement to benefits [68]. However, these gains tend to be
disproportionately vulnerable both to economic crises
and to systemic, globalization-related pressures for
"labour market 'flexibility' and fiscal restraint" [75](p.
25). As suggested earlier, the work itself may have destruc-
tive health consequences: women in Bangladesh "do not
necessarily expect to work in garment factories for a pro-
longed period. Indeed, given the toll taken on their health
by long working hours, it would not be possible to under-
take such work for an extended period of time" [76](p.
151). Thus, whatever economic opportunities globaliza-
tion has opened up in such cases, they may be available
only at the price of exposure to hazardous working condi-
tions.
The UNRISD study is one illustration among many of the
need to consider the interplay among multiple elements
and consequences of globalization. Its South Korean case
study, for example, emphasizes the relations among
labour markets, social policy, trade agreement commit-
ments, and responses demanded by the International
Monetary Fund to the financial crises of 1997–98 [77].
Mexico actively embraced economic integration well
before trade liberalization was entrenched through the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). It did so
partly as a response to the first of a series of financial crises
(a temporary default on foreign debt in 1982) the origins
of which were themselves global, or at least multinational,
but the global diffusion of free-market ideology likewise
played a role [78,79]. Drastic currency depreciation asso-
ciated with Mexico's financial crises, which persisted in
spite of policies adopted in response, magnified the direct
effects of labour markets on declines in purchasing power
and economic polarization within Mexican society [80-
83]. This is just one example of how trade liberalization,
the new international division of labour and other ele-
ments of globalization are bound up with international
financial integration and debt crises.
Cluster 3: Debt crises and marketization under pressure
A long history of debt crises constrains the ability of many
developing countries to meet basic needs in the areas of
public health, education, water, sanitation and nutrition.
Recently, debt service payments have contributed to a
larger pattern of financial transfers from the South to the
North, most importantly the United States, which contra-
dicts colloquial wisdom about the direction of global
financial flows [84]. The etiology of debt crises varies from
country to country and over time [85-88], but a stylized
list of major causes includes: (a) the oil price shocks of
1973 and 1979–80, which had an especially severe impact
on low-income, oil-importing countries; (b) aggressive
lending by banks seeking to invest deposits from oil-
exporting countries (c) a rapid increase in real interest
rates during the early 1980s generated by the monetary
policies of the US Federal Reserve, meaning that debtor
countries often had to roll over existing debt at much
higher interest rates; (d) falling world prices, i.e. deterio-
rating terms of trade, for the primary commodities that are
the key exports of many developing economies; and (e)
capital flight, consisting both of outright theft and of the
rational, mostly legal shifting of assets abroad by eco-
nomic elites worried about tax increases and future deval-
uations.
In the context of globalization and its asymmetries, capi-
tal flight assumes special importance. Economic historian
Thomas Naylor [87] has commented that: "There would
be no 'debt crisis' without large-scale capital flight" (p.
370). More recently, Ndikumana & Boyce estimated that:
"During 1970–96, roughly 80 cents on every dollar that
flowed into [sub-Saharan Africa] from foreign loans
flowed back out as capital flight in the same year" [89](p.
122, emphasis added). They also calculate that the accu-
mulated value of flight capital from 25 African countries
between 1970 and 1996, plus imputed interest earnings,
was considerably higher than the entire value of the com-
bined external debt of those 25 countries in 1996 [90]. In
other words, taking into account privately held as well as
public assets, those African countries should be regarded
as net creditors rather than debtors vis-à-vis the rest of the
world. Using a similar methodology, Beja [91] estimates
Globalization and Health 2007, 3:6 http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/3/1/6
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the accumulated value of flight capital from Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand over the period
1970–2000 at $1 trillion, occurring not only during peri-
ods of financial crisis but also during periods of economic
growth and stability.
A further precondition for the occurrence of debt crises is
so basic that it is sometimes overlooked. Banks, national
governments and multilateral institutions such as the
World Bank have been willing, almost without exception,
to accord leaders of developing countries what philoso-
pher Thomas Pogge has called the "borrowing privilege":
the right to incur debts on behalf of those they rule with-
out having to defend the legitimacy of their rule. The bor-
rowing privilege is accorded even to leaders who have
taken power by force or deceit, maintain it by extreme
repression, and are not accountable to citizens in any
meaningful way [92].
The impacts of debt crises cannot be understood without
considering structural adjustment: a term that entered the
international development lexicon in 1980, when the
World Bank initiated loans, normally in conjunction with
stabilization loans from the IMF, that enabled recipient
countries to reorganize their economies in order to
increase their ability to repay external creditors. The
urgency of such lending grew after 1982, when Mexico's
announcement that it was prepared to default on loans
made by major US banks raised concern about the stabil-
ity of financial systems in the industrialized world. The
conditionalities attached to World Bank and IMF loans,
and to the associated rescheduling of loan payments,
emphasized reduction of subsidies for basic items of con-
sumption such as food; rapid removal of barriers to
imports and foreign direct investment; reductions in state
expenditures, particularly on social programmes such as
health, education, water/sanitation and housing; and
rapid privatization of state-owned enterprises, on the pre-
sumption that private service provision was inherently
more efficient, and that proceeds from privatization could
be used to ensure debt repayment [93,94]. In other words,
the World Bank and IMF promoted multiple, more or less
coordinated domestic policies of integrating national
economies into the global marketplace. In keeping with
widespread usage (see e.g. [94]), structural adjustment
here refers to the entire set of domestic policies adopted to
reorganize national economies in response to these
demands.
Research on health-related impacts of structural adjust-
ment confronts at least three design problems.
First, implementation of conditions attached to World
Bank and IMF loans was often incomplete [95] – leaving
open at least the theoretical possibility that if the reforms
in question had been undertaken even more aggressively,
outcomes might have been more favourable. However,
the recent history of market-oriented development policy
in the two regions of the developing world where it has
been pursued most aggressively, Latin America and Africa
[96,97], calls this claim into question. So too does the pat-
tern of magnification of inequality through labour market
outcomes that has resulted from domestic marketization
and export orientation [68,98].
Second, it can be difficult to separate effects of structural
adjustment from those of the globalization-related eco-
nomic crises that preceded and led to engagement with
the World Bank and IMF.
Third, and relatedly, every assessment of public policy
effects relies implicitly or explicitly on a counterfactual: an
alternative state of the world against which the state of the
world post-introduction of the policy in question is com-
pared. If structural adjustment is compared with the con-
tinuation of business as usual, which would in many cases
have involved (continued) hyperinflation and the isola-
tion of countries from international financial markets,
then structural adjustment may appear as the least
destructive option. On the other hand, if the comparison
is with an alternative set of policy options that would have
given priority to meeting basic needs, then conclusions
about the necessity and desirability of structural adjust-
ment are likely to be less sanguine. For countries highly
exposed to the international economy, this counterfactual
requires further assumptions about an alternative interna-
tional order at least partly driven by solidarity or concep-
tions of obligations that cross national borders – a point
to which we return in the third and final article of the
series.
A review of studies of the health effects of structural
adjustment carried out for the Commission on Macroeco-
nomics and Health [99] found a preponderance of nega-
tive effects among 76 studies identified, especially with
respect to Africa. This review understated the case against
structural adjustment because of incomplete sampling of
the literature: the authors' review of the country cases
from the "adjustment with a human face" study was cur-
sory, and they did not consider ethnographic studies (e.g.
[100-102]) and country-level participatory assessments
(e.g. [103]) that shed considerable light on the human
consequences of adjustment policies. A larger literature, in
much of which a "social democratic" counterfactual
[104](p.150) is implicit, describes negative effects of
structural adjustment on SDH, but does not extrapolate
from the conclusions to generate predictions or hypothe-
ses on health outcomes (for illustrative examples see
[94,94,103,105-110]).
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A stylized summary is that structural adjustment operated
on SDH both directly and indirectly. To illustrate, cuts in
food subsidies and in government wages and employ-
ment had direct negative effects on access to nutrition and
on household income. Import liberalization measures
may also have had negative impacts on social structure
mediated by labour markets, as livelihoods were lost to
low-cost imports. The major effects on social structure,
which are often difficult to trace to specific elements of
structural adjustment programs (say, to import liberaliza-
tion as opposed to cuts in state employment) have to do
with poverty, income inequality and changing gender
relations: for example, the disproportionate impact both
on women's incomes and on their household activities
(see e.g. [70,110]). Poverty and economic insecurity, in
turn, have multiple effects on exposure and vulnerability,
mediated by such factors as housing, working conditions,
and access to nutrition and education. Structural adjust-
ment also had important equity-related effects on health
systems, by way of expenditure reductions and implemen-
tation of cost recovery measures.
It is difficult to separate impacts on SDH of domestic pol-
icies that were adopted in specific response to lender con-
ditionalities from those adopted in response to the
broader diffusion of market-oriented policy ideas. How-
ever, the policy changes undertaken as part of structural
adjustment programs, which can be generically described
as marketization or (re)commodification [63,111], are
congruent with the market-oriented policy shifts that are
a key element of globalization more generally [78,94].
Ideally, it would be useful to know how much of a coun-
try's social and economic policy orientation in year x can
be attributed to responses to the World Bank and IMF,
and how much to national decision-makers' interpreta-
tion of the available options within an international eco-
nomic context over which they may have minimal
influence. However, even if it were answerable this ques-
tion would not alter the fact that if we want to know how
globalization affects SDH by way of marketizing domestic
social and economic policy, then research on structural
adjustment is valuable independent of specific historical
connections between lender conditionalities and policy
responses. Indeed, given the breadth and depth of struc-
tural adjustment conditionalities, it may be the single
most important body of evidence available.
That body of evidence is also valuable prospectively. Pov-
erty reduction has replaced structural adjustment in the
official vocabulary of the World Bank and the IMF, but
similar macroeconomic policy directions can be observed
in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) that
must be approved by the World Bank and IMF before
countries can receive debt relief under the Heavily
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative and its succes-
sor program, the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative
(MDRI), both of which are discussed in the third article in
the series. Increasingly, PRSPs are also required before a
much larger number of countries can receive grants or
concessional loans (i.e., loans at below-market interest)
from the World Bank or funding from national develop-
ment agencies [112,113]. The potential benefits of PRSPs
include the explicit identification of poverty reduction as
an objective of government policy, requirements for civil
society participation, and other administrative condi-
tions. As one specific illustration, Zambia's PRSP requires
that District Health Management Boards actually receive
at least 80 percent of their specified annual budgets
[114](¶20), which apparently had not been the case in the
past. On the other hand the macroeconomic policy con-
tent of PRSPs may be unduly influenced by lender prefer-
ences because of previous country experience with World
Bank and IMF conditionalities [115](p. 26–31): in other
words, the commitments of even the best-intentioned
governments to poverty reduction may, understandably
under the circumstances, be tempered by what they think
these institutions want to hear [116].
Cluster 4: Financial liberalization and financial crises
These are examples of overt conditionalities. However,
"implicit conditionality" [117] created by the expecta-
tions of investors may be at least as important as an influ-
ence on public policy. Increased volumes of foreign direct
investment (FDI) in production facilities have been
accompanied by vastly more rapid growth in portfolio
investment: in publicly traded shares, bonds, and an
expanding range of financial instruments generically
described as derivatives. Whereas the value of global FDI
flows was $1.2 trillion for all of 2006 [118], the daily value
of foreign currency transactions is now estimated at $1.9
trillion [119]. Financial liberalization exposes national
economies to the uncertainties created by large and vola-
tile short-term capital flows [120], instantiating Giddens'
[121](p. 64) identification of globalization as "an intensi-
fication of world-wide social relations which link distant
localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped
by events occurring many miles away and vice versa."
Unlike the imposition of conditionalities by the World
Bank and IMF, large-scale disinvestment in response to
apprehensions about the viability of a particular national
economy or currency requires no formal coordination,
still less any kind of conspiracy. It requires only reliance
on similar sources of information, such as credit rating
agencies [122], and comparable levels of risk aversion on
the part of individual private investors and portfolio man-
agers.
The effects of large-scale disinvestment and the resulting
financial crises on the 'real economy' and on SDH have
been devastating, undermining the livelihoods of hun-
Globalization and Health 2007, 3:6 http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/3/1/6
Page 8 of 17
(page number not for citation purposes)
dreds of millions of people as national currencies lost 50
percent or more of their value relative to hard currencies
like the US dollar; purchasing power evaporated; and
restoring the country's creditworthiness in the eyes of
investors with the option of placing their assets elsewhere
took priority over meeting basic needs domestically. This
happened in Mexico in 1994–95, as Mexican and foreign
investors shifted their assets out of Mexican government
debt securities and forced further devaluation of the peso
[123]; in south Asia in 1997–98, even among the so-
called Tiger economies that were counted among globali-
zation's success stories, after flight from the region's cur-
rencies began with speculation against the Thai baht [124-
126]; and most recently in Argentina in 2001–02 [127]. In
an especially striking instance of long-distance effects,
investor concern about the stability of all developing
country currencies in the wake of crises in Korea (late
1997) and Russia (early 1998) led to a selloff of Brazilian
assets that forced a currency devaluation. This happened
even though connections between Brazil's economy, and
the economic lives of most Brazilians, with events in
Korea or Russia were minimal [128,129]. Predictably
given existing national and household-level distributions
of power and access to resources, the impact of financial
crises is often felt first, and worst, by women [130,131] –
suggesting, as do many other aspects of globalization's
impacts, the need for a gender-specific approach to macr-
oeconomic and social policy responses on the part of
researchers, national governments, and multilateral insti-
tutions alike [64,65,132,133].
The effects of financial crises may sometimes be magni-
fied by contractionary economic policies, financial sector
liberalization or labour market 'reforms' undertaken in
response, either as the price of bailouts from the IMF and
industrialized country governments or as an attempt to
restore credibility with investors who have shifted their
assets elsewhere [134-138]. If financial liberalization pro-
motes growth [138], it may be at the cost of an increase in
economic inequality [136]; conversely, in at least one case
(that of South Korea) financial crises actually generated
political support for a limited expansion of the welfare
state [139]. Less amenable to conflicting interpretations
are the findings of a comparison of financial crises in 10
countries [140] that showed that employment recovers
much more slowly than GDP in the aftermath of financial
crises, exacerbating their effects on social stratification and
the vulnerabilities associated with economic inequality
and insecurity. A further effect is that the value of external
debt obligations denominated in dollars or other hard
currency climbs with any devaluation, creating additional
economic constraints on domestic public sector budgets
[141] in such areas as health care and education.
Using a schematic analogous to one developed with
respect to globalization and HIV infection, described in
the first article of this series [142], Hopkins [143] cites
research showing that reductions in household income as
a result of financial crises in Indonesia, Thailand and
Malaysia during the late 1990s led to reduced food intake,
health care utilization and education expenditure. Indica-
tive of the potential health effects is a Korean national sur-
vey that found substantial increases in morbidity, and
decreases in health service utilization, following the 1997
currency crisis [144]. Simultaneously, declining tax reve-
nues led to lower public expenditure on health and edu-
cation. The combined effect was to increase mortality and
reduce longevity – a disturbing reprise of the findings of
UNICEF's original Adjustment With a Human Face study
[145]. Although the depth and duration of financial crises
and their impacts on SDH vary considerably, asymmetry
characterizes their origins and impacts both domestically
(in terms of economic effects and the distribution of
opportunities to escape them) and internationally (in
terms of the global shift in power toward the owners of
internationally mobile financial assets).
Cluster 5: Cities restructured by the global marketplace
Long-distance effects of quite a different kind are evident
in changing patterns of urban form and settlement, and
assume special importance given the estimate that the
world's urban population will have grown by more than
two billion people between 2005 and 2030. Almost all of
this growth will occur in countries with limited resources
to provide urban and peri-urban infrastructure that is
taken for granted in most of the industrialized world
[146]. A consistent pattern in the transformation of cities
and metropolitan areas by transnational economic inte-
gration, in countries rich and poor alike, is that gaps
between economic winners and losers grow, based on
their position within the global economy and the basis of
their connection (or lack of connection) to it. Statistics on
income disparities capture only part of the picture. Cas-
tells' description of the urban impacts of globalization in
terms of a "space of flows" [147] is valuable because it
reminds us that 'connectedness' to the networks of invest-
ment and information that characterize the globalized
economy may have nothing to do with proximity as
viewed on a road map. Castells observes that urban dis-
tricts whose residents are not part of the "process that con-
nects advanced services, producer centers, and markets in
a global network" can become "irrelevant or even dys-
functional: for example, Mexico City's colonias populares
(originally squatter settlements) that account for about
two thirds of the megapolitan population, without play-
ing any distinctive role in the functioning of Mexico City
as an international business centre" [147](p. 380–381).
Thus, large metropolitan areas will contain substantial
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"local populations that are either functionally unneces-
sary or socially disruptive" [147](p. 404).
Spatial divisions that reflect or reinforce the pattern of
gains and losses from globalization arise in a variety of
ways. In parts of the industrialized world, they have been
initiated by large-scale job and income losses and eco-
nomic polarization associated with deindustrialization
[148-151]. Even in the immensely wealthy United States,
some cities with economies built on manufacturing lost
half to three-quarters of their manufacturing jobs in the
second half of the 20th Century [152-154], with devastat-
ing effects on economic opportunities and the social fab-
ric [155,156]. Urban 'revitalization' may include not only
policies that favour more desirable (read: higher-income)
residents, but also reconfiguration of urban space in pur-
suit of profitable commercial development and tourism
revenues, similarly leading to displacement of residents
and sometimes the literal enclosure of public spaces (see
e.g. [157-162]). Residential segregation deepens through
gentrification, suburbanization, and the creation of forti-
fied enclaves with separate private systems of service pro-
vision, while those less able to pay are shifted to less
desirable locations and rely on inferior services. Policy
choices with special significance for the boundaries of
inclusion/exclusion involve transportation, specifically
the balance between public transit and car-centred devel-
opment (see e.g. [160,163,164]). In this and other cases,
access to essential resources is often determined by indi-
vidual households' ability to pay or by group/neighbour-
hood attractiveness as a market. Poverty may be
criminalized [165,166]. These processes are documented
in an indispensable UN Habitat synthesis on Cities in a
Globalizing World [167], hence the lack of more extensive
references here.
Bidding contests for urban spaces, which epitomize the
interplay of global power relations and local opportuni-
ties, are paralleled by contests over locationally valuable
non-urban resources, notably those associated with the
expanding business of tourism. These contests can exclude
current, low-value or low-productivity users of a resource
either by degradation, e.g. by using surface or ground
water as a sink for the disposal of toxic wastes [168], or by
enclosure, e.g. by pricing the use of specific locations and
resources out of reach of all but the wealthy [169-171].
The common analytical denominators in these conflicts
are: (a) in the global marketplace, some resources simply
command too high a price to be used for the basic needs
of people with limited purchasing power, and (b) domes-
tically, the polarization of income and wealth that accom-
panies economic integration shifts the political
allegiances of decisive political pluralities in the direction
of private service provision rather than collective action.
Asymmetry, once again.
Cluster 6: Globalization, natural resources and 
environmental exposures
The global marketplace for natural resources and services
or amenities provided by the natural environment creates
an important and complex set of influences on SDH.
Stonich and Bailey [172](p. 23–24) argue that pressure to
increase export earnings leads governments to promote
"export-oriented aquacultural development regardless of
the social and environmental consequences," creating sit-
uations in which "the increasing use of low-value fish spe-
cies in the production of fishmeal for aquacultural feeds
in effect puts the poor in competition with shrimp," and
with the rich consumers who can afford to buy them (see
also [173]). This is one instance of a pattern noted by the
health synthesis of findings from the Millennium Ecosys-
tem Assessment (MEA) project, which explicitly recog-
nized economic globalization as one of the drivers of
change in ecosystems and human well-being by way of
various causal pathways: "Historically, poor people dis-
proportionately have lost access to ecosystem services as
demand from wealthier populations has grown" [174](p.
28). The ecosystem services in question may themselves
be essential to health, or else may be essential sources of
livelihood the loss of which leads to economic insecurity
and deprivation. The difference globalization makes is
that winning bidders may be half a world away, as in Ston-
ich's aquaculture example and in the case of markets for
tropical timber, oil in Nigeria (where abundant resource
revenues have failed to improve the grinding poverty and
poor health status of much of the country's population),
and coltan and other minerals in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo [175-181].
As globalization increases aggregate demand for marketa-
ble resources and ecological services, it simultaneously
fosters policies and institutions that facilitate control over
gains and losses across entire regional economies by local
elites and the dominant actors in global commodity
chains (see e.g. [177,178]). Analysis of investment in
developing countries by transnational logging companies
in response to increasing global demand for tropical tim-
ber was strongly critical of the sustainability of forest man-
agement practices, and further noted that: "Where
analysis is available... the economic benefit is minor, even
in the short-term, and certainly far less than it could be if
contracts were structured and negotiated differently.
While large amounts of capital are involved, the revenue
to national treasuries can be small because most of the
profits leave the country or accrue in the hands of very
few, often already wealthy and powerful local people"
[179](p. 29, citations omitted). Transnational mineral
firms are often the beneficiaries of large-scale financial
support from export credit and insurance agencies in their
home countries [182,183] – an element of global influ-
ence that appears to have received little research attention
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outside a rather specialized community of CSOs. In such
cases, global asymmetries of economic power are reflected
in extreme inequalities in the distribution of benefits
domestically.
The MEA health synthesis noted another set of differential
exposures and vulnerabilities: "Poor populations are
more vulnerable to adverse health effects from both local
and global environmental changes" [174](p. 27), first of
all because they are more likely to be exposed to hazards
from which the rich can remove themselves. Disasters in
Bhopal and New Orleans provide dramatic evidence of
this point, as do the routine conditions of urban life for
literally hundreds of millions of people worldwide [184].
It is estimated that more than 850 million people now live
in slums, with the number projected to rise to 1.4 billion
in 2020 in the absence of effective policy interventions
[146]. Slum residence is an imperfect, but nevertheless
useful proxy for exposure to urban environmental hazards
including infectious disease related to inadequate sanita-
tion and industrial pollution, as well as other quotidian
risks exemplified by the collapse of a rain-soaked open
rubbish dump that killed some of the residents of
Manila's informal settlements in 2000 [185,186].
Some studies find a clear pattern of migration of hazard-
ous industries to lower-income countries, notably to
export processing zones (EPZs) [50,52]. Other, quantita-
tive studies that do not focus on particular regions suggest
that evidence for the emergence of industrial "pollution
havens" is equivocal or absent [187,188]. An impression-
istic assessment of such 'negative' findings is that many
are compromised by (a) failure to focus on the global
restructuring of production within specific industries or
sectors; (b) concentration on foreign direct investment
(FDI), without considering contractual arrangements
such as outsourcing that are not recorded in FDI statistics
but are extensively described in the literature on commod-
ity or value chains; (c) inability to distinguish causal
effects of lax environmental regulation on relocation of
production (what the pollution haven hypothesis is all
about) from those of other variables, such as low wages
and flexible working conditions, that tend to operate in
parallel; and (d) failure to distinguish between changes in
pollution exposures attributable to industrial processes
and to such factors as increased vehicle traffic. (Pollution
exposures resulting from increased vehicle traffic may also
be consequences of globalization, e.g. as it supports a
growing 'middle class' and associated settlement patterns,
but these consequences are analytically separable from
the industrial migration or pollution havens hypotheses.)
Substantial evidence also exists of the emergence of a glo-
bal trade in hazardous wastes, with disposal in low-
income countries becoming increasingly attractive and
met with policy responses that are at best only partially
effective [189-192].
In the background is the question of whether such envi-
ronmental changes and their health impacts should be
regarded as normal, in the sense that they are comparable
to those undergone by the industrialized countries at
comparable stages of their own economic development.
Evidence of the extent to which contemporary technology
allows for "technological leapfrogging" [193] and "dema-
terialization" [194], which avoid many environmentally
destructive forms of industrial production and consump-
tion, suggests that this conclusion should be rejected.
However, environmental and resource impacts can alter-
natively be considered with reference to a green counter-
factual that assumes transfer of clean technologies on
favourable terms, along with serious efforts by the indus-
trialized economies to reduce their consumption of natu-
ral resources and ecological services, and to adopt policies
that minimize negative environmental and resource
impacts outside their borders. Thus, globalization's nega-
tive effects on SDH that operate by way of the environ-
ment, like those that operate in other ways, must be
regarded primarily as consequences of political choices
and avoidable failures of governance.
Cluster 7: Marketization of health systems
Health care interventions that would be taken for granted
in the industrialized world are routinely unavailable, or
available only to rich minorities, outside it [100,195,196].
As a result, literally millions of preventable deaths occur
every year. Multilateral institutions like the World Bank
have historically worsened this situation by promoting
and reinforcing a market-oriented concept of health sector
reform (HSR) that strongly favours private provision and
financing [66,197,198]. Reductions in public sector
health spending, introduction of user fees, and other cost
recovery measures aimed at making health systems finan-
cially self-sustaining were often mandated as part of struc-
tural adjustment conditionalities [101,199-202] despite
their regressive impacts. (Although the World Bank has
now acknowledged the inequity of relying on user fees
and private purchase of health care in its commendably
equity-oriented 2006 World Development Report [203](p.
146–149), it continues to promote private health insur-
ance in developing countries in conjunction with the
financial services industry [204].)
Official user charges in some instances may replace infor-
mal, and even more inequitable patterns of side payments
demanded by care providers or suppliers of medicines
[205-207], but their effectiveness in generating revenue is
limited, while access to health care for the poor and oth-
erwise vulnerable often deteriorates (for reviews see [208-
212]; key case studies include [201,213-223]). This dete-
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rioration occurs because very large numbers of people
simply cannot afford necessary health care [224-227].
Ethnographic research and the experiences of front-line
care providers [100,195,228] support the conclusion that
the issue is often not one of unwillingness to pay, but
rather of inability to pay, and understandable reluctance
to sell off assets that may be critical to the household's
economic survival [224,229].
Marketization of health systems may also compromise
progress in other health-related areas such as poverty
reduction, as medical costs and lost earnings associated
with serious illness create "medical poverty traps" [225];
as noted earlier, these effects will not be reflected in
national poverty statistics when poverty is defined with
reference to household consumption [14]. Viet Nam is
often cited as an example of the poverty-reduction bene-
fits of embracing the global marketplace, yet health indi-
cators reflect the widespread 'double burden of disease'
phenomenon in which infectious diseases largely eradi-
cated in the industrialized world coexist with rapidly ris-
ing incidence of chronic non-infectious diseases and
injuries from such causes as road traffic accidents [230];
opening up of domestic markets has been accompanied
by the dismantling of relatively equitable systems for
social and economic provision [215,220,230]. In a much
larger country, whatever the economic gains from China's
domestic social and economic policy reforms, a survey of
several Chinese provinces found that the percentage of
women with insurance coverage for prenatal and delivery
services fell from 58.3 percent in 1989 to 34.7 percent in
1997; overall access to insurance coverage, already availa-
ble to just one in four Chinese in 1989, continued to
decline slowly through the 1990s [231]. The public share
of health expenditures fell by over half between 1980 and
1998, almost trebling the portion paid by households
[219], leading to the growth of private delivery systems for
those who could afford them, and increased cost-recovery
for services that were still under some form of public
health insurance. The result was an increase in the
number of people who fell into poverty by exhausting
their income and savings to pay for medical treatment
[219] and a slowdown in China's population health
improvements, particularly infant mortality and life
expectancy [231]. It remains to be seen whether recent ini-
tiatives to reverse deterioration in access to health care for
the poor, notably in rural areas, will be effective
[232](p.15–19), [233].
Four further dimensions of globalization's effects on
health systems must be considered.
First, despite a WTO interpretation of TRIPS that limits
patent protection for essential medicines, concern
remains about the effectiveness of this interpretation as
reflected both in national legislation (in countries with
substantial pharmaceutical industries) and trade policy
practice (in countries without) [234].
Second, commitments made under the General Agree-
ment on Trade in Services (GATS) and bilateral and
regional agreements such as NAFTA have the potential to
lock in privatization initiatives against future govern-
ments' efforts to expand public provision or insurance
[235,236], although disagreement exists about the seri-
ousness of this prospect.
Third, the 'brain drain' of health professionals from devel-
oping countries, in particular those in sub-Saharan Africa,
to industrialized countries where they can earn far more is
now recognized as one of the most serious problems con-
fronting health systems [237-239]. Solutions remain elu-
sive because the situation reflects a bidding contest for the
services of health professionals that is analogous in many
respects to the bidding contests for urban space and loca-
tionally valuable resources described in the preceding sec-
tion.
Fourth, health research priorities based on the availability
of private funding are highly problematic on health equity
grounds. Private for-profit firms (mainly pharmaceutical
firms) now outspend governments worldwide on health
research [240]; the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation
had more money at its disposal than the World Health
Organization [241] even before its recent windfall from
the assets of Warren Buffett; and public funding agencies
in many industrialized countries link their priorities to the
anticipation of commercial returns. The result is a major
mismatch between health research priorities and the main
contributors to the burden of disease outside the industri-
alized world. Of 1556 new drugs (new chemical entities)
marketed between 1975 and 2004, only 21 were for
neglected diseases, malaria and tuberculosis [242]. This
figure does not reflect a recent increase in research activity
related to 'neglected diseases' that has not yet led to new
marketable products [243]; neither does it take into
account the potential applicability to developing country
contexts of much research that addresses chronic non-
communicable diseases once largely confined to the
industrialized world, as the double burden of disease phe-
nomenon becomes more significant.
Coda
The story of globalization's impacts on health that is out-
lined here is not a cheerful one. Critics might argue that
we have failed to consider the parallel increases in wealth
and health worldwide during the second half of the last
century, and their historical point is undeniably accurate.
Economic growth has indeed made a large number of
concrete contributions to SDH, for example by supporting
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the transition to cleaner fuels for cooking and a resulting
decrease in pollution-related respiratory diseases, even as
this transition remains elusive for large numbers of the
world's people [244]. Further, as noted in the first article
of the series, a leading researcher on growth and health
warns that "economic growth, by itself, will not be
enough to improve population health, at least in any
acceptable time." He continued with the observation that:
"As far as health is concerned, the market, by itself, is not
a substitute for collective action" [245]; for elaboration
see [246]. Even leaving aside this observation, the past is
not always a reliable guide to the future. Grand narratives
about globalization and health that rely on one or two
measures of either global market integration or health
yield unconvincing conclusions, and their failure explic-
itly to address the multiple asymmetries that characterize
contemporary globalization means they provide little
guidance for policy. In this article we have chosen to focus
our gaze more precisely. Our findings are not definitive,
but they point to a certain urgency in rearranging the rules
under which contemporary globalization is unfolding. A
preliminary description of key elements of the necessary
rearrangement is provided in the third and final article of
this series.
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